2011年10月3日星期一
That leaves option three
Option three might be a defense buildup. It might be a threat. It might be Rosetta Stone any number of things. But they resolve to, all of them, accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state armed with ballistic missiles. This would, indeed, be ironic, if it is the Bush administration that ends up managing the international situation in North East Asia, and North Korea becomes a nuclear weapons state for all the world to see with all the implications that might have for Japan and others in the region. I am, therefore, concerned, and I'm glad that you will be here tomorrow. I wish I would be with you in order that you could figure out what to do about this. Thank you very much (Applause). Moderator?: Ambassador Gallucci has agreed to take a couple of questions. Just a few, because we have an early morning tomorrow. Could you please, when you stand up, raise your hand? I'll call you. And identify yourself, if you would, please.[Audience] :(Unmiked/Inaudible Portion)BG: That's sort of what I'm a little concerned about. I mean, there's an assumption in what I said, and that is that headlines in The Washington Post about pre-emption and preventive war and a capable United States, which we are, does not in itself create sufficient intimidation to cause the North Koreans to back down. I mean, if that worked, then I would say this administration might be applauded for its courage. It's a bit risky. But I would say that was impressive. I would also be surprised if that worked. And in your question, I see Rosetta Stone Software that, what I see about that is: suppose we straightline, sort of, the last year-and-a-half, the first three phases. Where do we end up? Well, I don't know who is going to go and represent the United States or what they're going to say when they get there. But I worry that it will not be enough. And I worry that Bolton may be correct. If there is no nuclear weapons program, then we are where we are, and maybe we stumble through the agreed framework, maybe we don't. If you abandon the agreed framework, then, of course, you've got the existing program that you can see. If you keep the agreed framework, I wonder what you're keeping it for. The purpose of the agreed framework was to stop a nuclear weapons program. If there's a covert one, the agreed framework isn't working. If you don't use the agreed framework, as we did in 1998, to lever the North Koreans to permit access, then why are you continuing with the agreed framework? I don't get it. Frankly.All right? If however, they, I mean, there's time for that kind of strategy to unfold. But I think, philosophically, it will be hard for this administration to do that. The philosophy they've put forth I believe is quite important to them. I'm talking about the administration as though it was a single unified entity. And I think we know it ain't that. But I'm concerned about straightlining the current situation and where we will end up. [Audience]: (Unmiked/Inaudible)BG: No. I mean, I can't. My view of that statement is that I will take it at face Rosetta Stone German value that he said that. But the administration at the time, I don't believe that would have prevented a strike.
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